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INTRODUCTION

I think what's actually more hurtful to me in the citizenship process
than the length of time it's taken, is the way some of us are treated
differently. If everybody was subject to the same process and it took
everybody a long time to naturalize, maybe that would be more understandable. But when the government picks people out of the line
and keeps them waiting for long, long periods of time, especially
when this seems to be done on account of people's religion or national origin[,] and when they have been law-abiding, they do not
deserve this.
-Mahdi Asgari'
A formerly secret U.S. government program, the Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP), was recently exposed by
the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (ACLU/SC). 2
This covert program affected and continues to affect many individuals
and families originating from Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and South
Asian communities.' The United States Citizenship and Immigration
1. JENNIE PASQUARELLA, ACLU S. CAL., MusLIMS NEEDo NOT APPLv: How USCIS
SECRETLY MANDATES TiHi DISCRIMINATORY DELAY AND DENIAL OF CrrIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION BENEFITS To ASPIRING AMERICANs 39 (Ahilan Arulanantham et al. eds.,

2013), available at http://www.aclusocal.org/CARRP.
2. The ACLU declares itself the "guardian of ... individual rights and liberties[,]"
including: First Amendment, equal protection, due process, and privacy rights. About the
ACLU, ACLU, https://www.aclu.orglabout-aclu-0 (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). "The ACLU
also works to extend rights to segments of our population that have traditionally been
denied their rights, including people of color; women; lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and
transgender people; prisoners; and people with disabilities." Id. The organization's work
consists of legal, legislative, and community based action. Id. The ACLU/SC chapter was
established in 1923 by author Upton Sinclair. Our History, ACLU S. CAL., http://www
.aclusocal.org/our-history (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
3. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 1; see also Press Release, Lawyers' Committee for

Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, New Report Exposes a Covert U.S. Government Immigration Program that Unlawfully Prevents Many Muslim Applicants from Becoming Citizens and Lawful Immigrants (Aug. 21, 2013), available at http://www.lccr.com/
assets/press-releases/FINAL%20CARRP%20PRESS%20RELEASE%208-20-13.pdf
("The ACLU of Southern California (ACLU S. Cal.), the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area (LCCR), and the law firm of Mayer Brown ...
released a [seventy]-page report exposing a covert government program called the 'Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP) . . . .'").
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Services (USCIS)-the agency responsible for overseeing lawful immigration to the United StateS4-blacklists these minorities based on lawful
religious activity, national origin, and obscure links to certain groups and
associations.' Shockingly, CARRP "directs agency officers to delay and
ultimately deny the immigration benefits applications of applicants it has
blacklisted, all without even telling these individuals that they were labeled threats to our nation, let alone giving them an opportunity to respond to the allegations." 6
This Comment highlights the problems minorities, especially minorities
of the Muslim faith, are subjected to in the unfair investigation and adjudication of their naturalization applications. This Comment references
the official report produced by the ACLU/SC, titled Muslims Need Not
Apply: How USCIS Secretly Mandates the DiscriminatoryDelay and Denial of Citizenship and Immigration Benefits to Aspiring Americans,' to
illustrate why it is imperative that the USCIS act on the recommendations set out by the ACLU/SC to further avoid discriminatory practices
against these lawful residents.
To highlight these problems, Section II of this Comment provides a
brief background on the legal authority of the USCIS, as well as the policy background of CARRP, and how the program has been designed to
operate to the detriment of minorities. Sections III through V discuss
some of the crucial findings by the ACLU/SC. Section III focuses on how
CARRP unreasonably impacts law-abiding immigrants from obtaining
naturalization. Section IV discusses how CARRP overreaches the authority of Congress by purposefully creating an extra-statutory section regarding which individuals are and are not eligible for naturalization.
Section V illustrates how this policy delays and denies naturalization for
many law-abiding immigrants by labeling them as members of terrorist
organizations, based on remote and non-linear affiliations. This particular section will bring forth some eye-opening CARRP-related cases, in-

4. About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/aboutus
(last updated Sept. 12, 2009).
5. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Id. Immigration benefits denied to such individuals include: "granting of U.S. citizenship to those who are eligible to naturalize, authorizing individuals to reside in the U.S.
on a permanent basis, and providing aliens with the eligibility to work in the United States
. ." Providing
...
Immigration Benefits & Information, DFP'T. OF HOMELAND SIc., https://
www.dhs.gov/providing-immigration-benefits-information (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
7. See generally PASQUARELLA, supra note 1 (spotlighting CARRP policies and their
USCIS application); Jennie Pasquarella & Bardis Vakili, Muslims Need Not Apply: How
USCIS Secretly Mandates the Discriminatory Delay and Denialof Citizenship and Immigration Benefits, CLE Webinar, ACLU S. CAL. (Aug. 20, 2013), http://vimeo.comn/72833429
(administering a short presentation on CARRP).
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cluding the stories of Tarek Hamdi, Hassan Razmara,9 Jamal Atalla,'o
and Mirsad Hajro."
I.

A.

OVERVIEW OF THE

USCIS

AND

CARRP

The NaturalizationProcess and the Legal Authority of the USCIS

To first understand the workings of CARRP, it is essential to discuss
the naturalization process. Many decades have passed since Congress allegedly eradicated discrimination from the naturalization process by passing the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).12 A person
seeking United States naturalization must meet a prescribed set of requirements under the INA, including: "a sufficient period of physical
presence in the United States, good moral character, an understanding of
the English language, and some knowledge of the history and government of the United States."1 3
To apply for naturalization an individual "must have been a lawful permanent resident for at least five years and resided continuously in the
United States up to the date of admission to citizenship, as well as be a
person of good moral character."' 4 This "good moral character" requirement is not an easy element to meet since Congress has not explicitly
defined what it means to be of "good moral character." 5 Instead, the

8. See generally Hamdi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. EDCV 10-894
VAP DTBx, 2012 WL 632397 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2012) (examining facts relevant to
Mr. Hamdi's application for naturalization).
9. See generally PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 8-9 (detailing problems faced by

Mr. Razmara in his quest for citizenship).
10. See generally Atalla v. Kramer, No. CVO9-1610-PHX-NVW, 2011 WL 2457492 (D.
Ariz. June 20, 2011) (cataloging Mr. Atalla's naturalization application and investigation).
11. See generally Hajro v. Barrett, 849 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (recounting
Mr. Hajro's roadblocks).
12. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Importantly, federal law currently
states, "The right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not
be denied or abridged because of race or sex or because such person is married." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1422 (2012).
13. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 12; see generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423, 1427(a) (2012)
(providing pertinent legislation).
14. Amber Pershon, Comment, Processing Citizenship:JurisdictionalIssues in the UnreasonableDelay of Adjudication of NaturalizationApplications, 5 P1 ]OI'Nix L. Reiv. 259,
270 (2011); see 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012) (announcing naturalization requirements).
15. See V. Woerner, Annotation, What Constitutes Showing of "Good Moral Character" on the Part of an Applicant for Naturalization,22 A.L.R. 2d 244, § 2 (1952) ("[T]he
statute makes no attempt to define 'good moral character[]' .... ). Cf 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)
(2012) (enumerating reasons an individual fails to meet the good moral character
requirement).
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void has forced courts to decide on a case-by-case basis, as a matter of
fact, what constitutes "good moral character."1 6
Upon exploring these initial requirements, the next step of the naturalization process includes completion of a background check." The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) completes the background check, at which
point in time, the U.S. Citizenship Immigration Services (USCIS) is precluded from scheduling any further steps until it receives confirmation
from the FBI indicating the full criminal background check has been
completed?
Upon receiving a response from the FBI, the applicant is tested to
demonstrate his or her "understanding of the English language, including
an ability to read, write, and speak words in ordinary usage in the English
language . . . and a knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of

the history, and of the principles and form of government, of the United
States."' 9 In addition to this test, the applicant must attend an in-person
interview (scheduled by the USCIS), in which the USCIS examiner is
able to ask questions and take additional testimony, as related to the naturalization application.20
Based upon this information, the USCIS examiner must determine
whether the application for naturalization is approved or denied. 2 ' This
USCIS process and the process to adjudicate naturalization applications
should be completed within 180 days.2 2

16. Woerner, ("[C]onsidering that the statute makes no attempt to define 'good moral
character,' that it is not a term susceptible of precise definition, and that it is left to the
judicial discretion of the courts to find its existence or nonexistence as a matter of fact in
each individual case, it is not surprising that the cases should conflict. The conflict between
the authorities is primarily one of application and result rather than of principle, for the
courts are in accord as to the general rules and principles underlying the good moral character requirement of the naturalization statutes.").
17. See Pershon, supra note 14, at 270.
18. 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(b) (2013); see Pershon, supra note 14, at 270-71 (discussing the
disadvantageous nature of the regulation requiring a full background check through the
FBI before the USCIS can proceed with the naturalization process).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (2006).
20. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at (outlining the naturalization process following the
FBI background check, in which the applicant is interviewed to substantiate the information provided in the application).
21. See id. at 12 (noting candidate approval for naturalization is compulsory when all
requirements have been met).
22. Statutory provisions related to naturalization will be discussed later; that discussion aims to show that it was the intent of Congress to ensure the USCIS process and
adjudicate naturalization applications within one-hundred and eighty days of the application date. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 13 (reiterating statutory language clearly indicates the "USCIS is generally expected to process and adjudicate a naturalization
application within [one-hundred and eighty] days").
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Controlled Access Review and Resolution Program (CARRP)
Overview

The existence of CARRP in a post-9/11 world is an overly broad burden on certain minorities applying for immigration-related benefits to the
USCIS. The atrocity of the 9/11 attacks continues to heavily impact immigration, as it is now "viewed through the prism of national security." 23
The USCIS implemented and began using CARRP in 2008, "establish[ing] a uniform, agency-wide policy for handling applications with perceived national security concerns intended to 'ensure that immigration
benefits are not granted to individuals and organizations that pose a
threat to national security."' 24
The existence of CARRP was first revealed during the case of Tarek
Hamdi. It was through his case the ACLU/SC published the report titled
"Muslims Need Not Apply: How USCIS Secretly Mandates the Discriminatory Delay and Denial of Citizenship and Immigration Benefits to Aspiring Americans." 25 The information in this report is based on "USCIS
CARRP policy documents, memoranda, officer training materials, and
other information obtained through litigation and Freedom of Information Act .. . requests." 26 This report gathered information based on existing facts and procedures regarding CARRP policy. Evidently, many of
the documents requested from the USCIS through the Freedom of Information Act have been heavily redacted, leaving room for uncertainty and
more confusion.2 7
CARRP essentially operates as a four-stage program designed to cripple the naturalization process by burdening the applicant with much extra
scrutiny. The program's ultimate aim is pre-textual denial.

23. Cyrus D. Mehta, The Insightful Immigration Blog - Commentaries on Immigration
Policy, Cases and Trends, Nearly 12 Years After 9/11 Applicants Perceived as Muslims Still
Targeted Under a Secret Immigration Program, CYRus D. Mi-lffA & Assoc. PLLC
(Aug. 25, 2013), http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2013/08/nearly-12-years-after-911 -applicants
.html.
24. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 15 (emphasis added); see also U.S. CrrIZENSHIIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., CARRP OFFICER TRAINING: NATIONAL SECURITY HANDOUTS,
GUIDANCE FOR IDENTIFYING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 3 (2009), available at https:/
/www.aclusocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Guiance-for-Identifying-NS-ConcernsUSCIS-CARRP-Training-Mar.-2009.pdf ("A [national security] concern, exists when an
individual or organization has been determined to have an articulable link to prior, current
or planned involvement in, or association with, an activity, individual or organization described in [the security and terrorism sections] of the Immigration and Nationality Act
25. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 7.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Id.
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Four Stages of CARRP

The following excerpt provides an overview of the basic four stages of
the CARRP policy:
CARRP's process for adjudicating benefits applications proceeds in
four basic stages. Stage One involves identifying whether a "national
security concern" exists in an individual case. If so, USCIS will move
the case from a "routine adjudication" track to a CARRP policy.
The case will remain on a CARRP track so long as the agency continues to believe that the person poses a "national security concern"
or is otherwise instructed by the FBI to treat them as a concern.
Stages Two and Three are investigative stages, aimed at finding a
reason to deny an application, and Stage Four is the adjudicative
stage at which point a decision must be rendered.2 8
The USCIS is responsible for screening every application it receives
from individuals applying for some sort of immigration benefit and ensuring that no possible "national security concern" exists.29 Although the
USCIS is not required to make a determination of an existing "national
security concern" at the beginning of the process, potentially concerning
applicants are generally identified early on. 3 0
"National security concerns" are identified as "individual[s] or organization[s] ... determined to have an articulable link to prior, current, or
planned involvement in, or association with, an activity, individual or organization described by [the security and terrorism sections]3 ' of the Immigration and Nationality Act." 32 The words "link" and "association
with" are not explicitly defined, leaving a gap in the statute, and thus
increasing the non-statutory decision-making ability of the USCIS, leading it to continue using the vague definition of what it means to qualify as
a national security concern.

28. Id. at 15; see U.S. CYFIHZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERvs., USCIS DOMESTIC OPIRATIONs DIRECMORATE (DOMOPS) CARRP WORKFLOws 1 (2008), available at https://

www.aclusocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CARRP-Workflows.pdf (illustrating and
summarizing the four step process).
29. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 17.
30. Id.
31. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(A)-(B), (F), 1227(a)(4)(A)-(B) (2012) (relating to security and terrorism concerns barring admission into the United States).
32. See Pasquarella,supra note 1, at 17 (quoting Memorandum from Jonathan R.
Scharfen, Deputy Director, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to USCIS Field Leadership, Policy for Vetting and Adjudicating Cases with National Security Concerns I n.1
(Apr. 11, 2008)).
33. Id.
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Security checks for applicants applying for naturalization are completed as soon as the applicant applies for immigration benefits. 3 4 in
designating an applicant as a national security concern, USCIS officers
are "directed to look for 'indicators' that may implicate 'national security
concerns' through responses to security checks or other information obtained during the adjudicative process."
i. Stage One: Identifying and Confirming a "National Security
Concern"
CARRP policy mandates the process of "deconfliction" begins before
any adjudicative action may be taken in any case involving a national
security concern, and continues at all stages of processing and adjudicating CARRP track applications.
Deconfliction means contacting the law enforcement agency that
possesses the supposed national security information about the applicant. . . "to ensure that any USCIS adjudicative activities (e.g., an
interview, request for evidence, site visit, decision to grant or deny a
benefit, or timing of the decision) do not compromise or imped any
ongoing investigation or other record owner interest."
The process of deconfliction allows the USCIS and other governmental
agencies potentially holding any national security information to freely
exchange information and "ensure that planned adjudicative activities do
not compromise or impede an ongoing investigation."
34. USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 12, Pt. B, Ch. 2, Background and Security Checks,
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volumel2-PartB-Chapter2.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). Security screening
includes fingerprinting, "name checks" conducted by the FBI, and "other inter-agency
criminal background and security checks." Id; see generally 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(b) (2013)
(mandating a criminal background check be completed by the FBI before any further USCIS examination).
U.S.

35. PASQUAREILLA, supra note 1, at 17; see U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
CARRP OFFicER TRAINING: NATIONAL SiEcuiuifY HANDOUTs, GUIDANCE FOR IDENTIFYING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNs 3-7 (2009), availableat https://www.aclusocal.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/01/Guiance-for-Identifying-NS-Concerns-USCIS-CARRP-TrainingMar.-2009.pdf (supplying a non-exhaustive list of possible national security concern
indicators).
36. Id. at 28, 30.
37. Id. at 28 (quoting U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., FRAUD DETEcflON
AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLLED APPUCATION

REVIEW AND RESOLUTION PRO-

GRAM (CARRP) INDEPENDENT SmDY 14 (2011)).
38. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CARRP DECONFLICION, INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL VETTING AND ADJUDICATION OF NS CONCERNs 8 (2011), available at

https://www.aclusocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CARRP-Deconfliction-Vetting-andAdjudication-of-NS-Concerns-Training-PowerPoint-v.-1.4.pdf. Deconfliction also "[p]ro-
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By so doing, law enforcement agencies such as the FBI can interfere
with any adjudicative action in place with leverage to delay or deny the
application. 39 This policy blatantly abuses authority actually vested in the
USCIS by empowering law enforcement agencies with the plenary power
to interfere with and remain heavily involved in the determination of an
immigration application.40
Under CARRP policy there are two variations of "national security
concerns." 4 ' Individuals either fall into the "Known or Suspected Terrorists" (KSTs) category or the "non-Known or Suspected Terrorists"
(non-KSTs) category. 42 KSTs are automatically considered national security concerns, 43 while non-KSTs qualify as national security concerns
when certain indicators are also present.4
CARRP policy prevents approval of any immigration benefits for applicants identified as KSTs. 45 Anyone on the Terrorist Watchlist is considered a KST and, therefore, automatically deemed a national security
concern by the USCIS for CARRP purposes.4 6 The Terrorist Watchlist is
the product of the Terrorist Screening Center, which was seen as a collab-

vides [the] USCIS with [an] opportunity to ask about: aliases, family relationships, residence within or outside the U.S., membership or involvement with organizations, military
training, and foreign travel." Id. at 9.
39. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 30.

40. Id.
41. Id. at 17.
42. Id.
43. Id. "[KST describes] individuals who: [1] have been nominated and accepted for
placement in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB); [2] are on the Terrorist Watch List;
[3] and have a specially coded lookout posted in TECS and/or the Consular Lookout Automated Support System (CLASS), as used by the Department of State." U.S. CITIZENSHIP

&

IMMIGRATION SERVS., FRAUD DEn-rTON AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLLED AP-

PLICATION REVIEW AND RESOLUTION PROGRAM (CARRP) INDEPENDENT

STUDY 9

(2011), available at https://www.aclusocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/FDNS-CARRPIndependent-Study-Powerpoint-v.-1.1 -Dec.-28-2011.pdf.
44. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 17; see U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,

supra note 24, at 2 (establishing the guidance on indicators of a national security concerns

does not apply to KSTs).
45. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 3.
46. Id. at 18; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERvS., supra note 43, at 9. "Ironically, while CARRP treats applicants as supposedly too dangerous to naturalize, they are
simultaneously treated as too harmless to expeditiously investigate, arrest or deport . . . ."
JENNIE PASQUARELLA, ACLU S. CAL., MUSLIMS NEED NOT APPLY: How USCIS
SECRETLY MANDATES THE DISCRIMINATORY DELAY AND DENIAL OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION BENEFITS To ASPIRING AMERICANS 2 (Ahilan Arulanantham et al. eds.,

2013), available at http://www.aclusocal.org/CARRP.
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orative effort by the government to further combat terrorism. 47 The federal government merged its "previously separate watchlists" maintained
by various federal agencies, paving the way for the Terrorist Watchlist in
March 2004.48
The Terrorist Watchlist is itself a failure of various sorts. Aside from
lawful minorities such as Muslims, many other innocent individuals fall
into a category the ACLU calls the "Unlikely Suspects." 49 The ACLU
reports the Terrorist Watchlist is "bloated and over inclusive," including a
U.S. Attorney, a pilot, U.S. armed forces veterans, elected public officials, and even Nelson Mandela on its list.so The inclusion of Nelson
Mandela, an international icon and crusader for freedom, on the U.S.
Terrorist Watchlist speaks volumes to the efficacy of such lists. Consequentially, Mandela was required to seek special permission before visiting the United States.5 ' Appropriately, "Mandela was removed from the
[Terrorist Watchlist] by an act of Congress in 2008-a solution the average person cannot rely upon."52
So what can the average person do? The broad reaches of power bestowed upon the USCIS are prevalent and the agency continually misidentifies correct national security concerns. In its CARRP report the
ACLU/SC concluded the "Terrorist [Watchlist] is a faulty, over-inclusive
list containing hundreds of thousands of names of individuals, including

47. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-1031, TERRORIST WATCH
SCREENING: EFFORTS TO HELP REDUCE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON TIFE Punic 7 (2006),

LIST

avail-

able at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061031.pdf.
48. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT Div., THm FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES

i

(2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf.
49. Unlikely Suspects, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/unlikely-

suspects (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
50. Id. "James Robinson had security clearance as a US Attorney but he consistently
receives additional screening at the airport when traveling." Id. "Erich Sherfen, Commercial airline pilot and Gulf War veteran, has been threatened with termination from his job
as a pilot because his name appears on a government watchlist, which prevents him from
entering the cockpit. Id. "Alexandra Hay, a college student with a double major in French

and English at Middlebury College in Vermont in 2004,... joined an ACLU lawsuit due to
problems she was having with the airline watch list." Id. "Sarosh Syed, a naturalized U.S.
citizen from Pakistan working for the ACLU of Washington in Seattle also had problems
flying." Id. "U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy (D, Mass.) ... had trouble getting removed

from the airline watch list despite calls to Homeland Security and eventually a personal
conversation with the Secretary of DHS." Id.
51. Mimi Hall, U.S. Has Mandela on Terrorist List, USA TODAY (Apr. 30, 2008, 8:10
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-04-30-watchlistN.htm.

52.

PASQUARELLA,

supra note 1, at 20.
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U.S. residents, who are never told they are on the [Watchlist] or given a
meaningful opportunity to dispute their inclusion on it.""
CARRP policy directs USCIS officer imposition of "an even more severe harm than the travel-related harms normally associated with inclusion on the [Terrorist Watchlist]." 5 4 By simply being on this Watchlist,
CARRP gives the USCIS the ability to delay if not deny anyone's immigration benefits application due to imputed national security concerns."
ii.

Stage Two: Internal Vetting

After an immigrant is deemed a national security concern, the next
steps involve vetting the individual to determine if the identified national
security concern can be resolved.56 Both the internal and external components of the vetting stages are decentralized and delegated to field offices, "allowing [the] USCIS to leverage field resources and experienced
officers for handling these difficult cases"
The second step of CARRP policy has bifurcated purpose.58 First, two
agency officers- a Fraud Detection and National Security-Immigration
Officer (FDNS-IO) and a CARRP-Immigration Services Officer
(CARRP-ISO)-thoroughly review the case file." "The FDNS-IO completes required systems checks and internal vetting, and the CARRP-ISO
completes an eligibility assessment of the CARRP case to determine
whether any statutory or regulatory ineligibility exist." 6 0 These officials
compile specific questions and issues "for discussion with the Record
Owner of the [national security] hit so that the critical decisions, such as
when an interview should be scheduled, can be made regarding adjudicating the application or petition." 61
At this particular stage of the CARRP application process, officers are
responsible for scrutinizing the application in a stricter manner than what

53. Id. at 2.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 31; Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to USCIS Field Leadership, Clarification
and Delineation of Vetting and Adjudication Responsibilities for Controlled Application
Review and Resolution Program (CARRP) Cases in Domestic Field Offices 3 (June 5,
2009), available at https://www.aclusocal.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Clarification-andDelineation-of-Vetting-and-Adjudication-Resps.-for-CARRP-June-5-2009.pdf [hereinafter
Neufeld Memorandum].
57. Neufeld Memorandum, supra note 56, at 1-2.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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would have been employed under a "routine adjudication." 6 2 More importantly, officers are looking for "any basis upon which they can deny
the application in order to avoid spending time and resources vetting the
national security concern (either internally or externally, with the relevant law enforcement agency) to determine whether there is a live
concern."63
USCIS documents obtained from the ACLU/SC indicate officers are
instructed to look at specific factors to further ascertain any reason to
deny the application. 64 "The instructions are specifically geared toward
finding a basis to deny an application on false testimony grounds or failure to prosecute an application."ss
If during this assessment the officer identifies a policy reason to deny
the application, the officer must again use the method of deconfliction to
"determine the position of any interested law enforcement agency, and
then, based on the results, either deny the application or hold it in abeyance per law enforcement instructions."6 6 It is sensible to think at this
point, if nothing is found, the immigration application would be cleared
from further scrutiny. Unfortunately, if even at this stage, the concern of
national security remains on the applicant, "and [if] the officer cannot
find a basis to deny the benefit" the application moves onto the third
stage of CARRP.6 '
iii.

Stage Three: External Vetting

The third stage of the CARRP process focuses on external vetting procedures, versus the internal vetting methods used in the previous stage."

62. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 31.
63. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis in original).
64. Id. at 31.
65. Id. The ACLU/SC highlights two cases, which, under CARRP policy, would have
been subject to denial under the internal vetting process, one of which adds fortune teller
to the list of credentials that the USCIS apparently holds:
Abrahim Mosavi, an Iranian national with no strong religious identity, has been waiting thirteen years for a fair adjudication of his application to naturalize. After subjecting him to years of delays and multiple RFEs regarding information that has no
statutory bearing on his eligibility for citizenship, and thousands of dollars in filing and
attorneys' fees, [the] USCIS denied Abrahim's application in 2010 on grounds that he
failed to provide information that was never asked of him. Upon appeal, [the] USCIS
again denied application, this time by making the false and illogical claim that in February 2010 he was outside the country into the future through June 2010 and that he
had been absent from the country for more than [one-hundred and eighty] days.
Id. at 32.
66. Id. at 33.
67. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 33.
68. Id.
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While similar, the two may be distinguished by the fact that the "internal
vetting relies on investigations using DHS's own data systems while external vetting relies on outside agencies to provide additional information, and may involve handling sensitive or classified information."69
In a case dealing with non-KST national security concerns, USCIS officer will confer with the applicant regarding the relevant national security concern.o Officers obtain facts and fact patterns from the applicant
to confirm "whether an articulable link exists between the individual and
an activity, individual, or organization described in [the security and terrorism sections] of the Act."
On the other hand, in KST cases, field
officers are not authorized to conduct the external vetting process with
applicants who possess information related to national security

concerns. 7 2
If at the end of the external vetting process the national security concern is no longer warranted and the applicant is concurrently eligible for
the particular application for which he or she applied, then the USCIS
has the discretion to approve the application.7 1 Otherwise, the applicant
moves into the fourth stage, adjudication.
iv.

Stage Four: Adjudication

If the application advances to the fourth stage of the CARRP process
and the national security concern designation remains on the individual,
the officer is required to evaluate the vetting process outcome and determine how that outcome would affect adjudication of the application.7 4
Officers are authorized to obtain other pertinent information through avenues such as a request for evidence, an interview, or an administrative
site visit as a means of "provid[ing] a basis to deny the application."
Ultimately, CARRP policy instructs USCIS officers "to thoroughly document an eligibility determination and to document and pursue facts that
would support removal, rescission, termination, or revocation of the person's underlying immigration benefit."
69. Id.
70. Memorandum from Jonathan R. Scharfen, Deputy Director, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., to USCIS Field Leadership, Policy for Vetting and Adjudicating Cases
with National Security Concerns 5 (Apr. 11, 2008), available at http://www.aclusocal.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CARRP-Policy-for-Vetting-and-Adjudicating-Cases-w-NSConcerns-Apr.-11-2008.pdf [hereinafter Scharfen Memorandum].
71. Id.
72. Id. at 6; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 28.
73. See Scharfen Memorandum, supra note 70, at 5.
74. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 33; U.S. CrrizrENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,

supra note 28.

75. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 33.

76. Id. at 33-34.
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UNREASONABLY IMPACTS LAw-ABIDING IMMIGRANTS
FROM OBTAINING NATURALIZATION

The CARRP program is inherently designed to blacklist specific minorities-particularly Muslims-and unduly delay (or in most instances,
deny) their U.S. citizenship applications. In 1990, Congress enacted a
statutory provision to decrease the amount of cases backlogged in the
naturalization process and reduce the wait time for naturalization applicants.78 Federal law now mandates the USCIS, when dealing with naturalization applications, make a decision within 120 days of the
naturalization interview. 79 Nonetheless, some minorities continue to
"suffer the hardships of unreasonably and unlawfully delayed naturalization, including anxiety over their immigration status, prolonged family
separations, ineligibility for certain employment opportunities or public
benefits reserved for U.S. citizens, and exclusion from the political process due to the inability to vote." 80
Unsurprisingly, "[a]gency delays in decision[-]making and action have
been widely acknowledged as a fundamental impediment to the effective
functioning of federal agencies for over thirty years, and more recently,
significant delays in regulatory action have raised serious concerns about
the political legitimacy of unfettered presidential control of the bureaucracy." 8 Until standards of accountability and transparency are forced
upon these government agencies, things will not change.
Law-abiding immigrants seeking United States citizenship suffer under
the broad power the USCIS exercises over the naturalization process.
Delays in regulatory changes or even acting on recommendations made

77. ACLU: Secret Government Program Blacklisted Muslims for U.S. Citizenship,

HUFFING TON Post LIVE (Aug. 22, 2013), http://live.huffingtonpost.com/r/archive/segment/

aclu-secret-government-program-blacklisted-muslims-for-us-citizenship5216b28bfe344444
84000638.
78. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 407(d)(14), 104 Stat. 4978,
5044 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2012)) (providing applicants the ability to
petition the court for a determination of their case if no decision was made after one-

hundred and twenty days).
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2012) (explaining statutory deadlines and procedures concerning naturalization interviews).
80. First Amended Complaint at 2, Rangoonwala v. Swacina, No. 08-21588-CIV, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99053 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/
chdocs/Weaver-cmpl.pdf.
81. Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach
Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging,79 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1381, 1381 (2011). This Article comments on how agencies, such as the

USCIS, may fall victim to the whims of the political priorities of the President rather than
serve the people in the most effective way. Id. at 1396.
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by the ACLU will only increase the number of law-abiding immigrants
robbed of their lawful right to naturalize in the United States.
Weeding out national security concerns is seen as the pretext for implementing CARRP, but instead the policy is "'based on criteria that ultimately have nothing to do with real security concerns ...

"82

In Kungys

v. United States," the United States initiated a citizenship revocation action against Juozas Kungys on the basis of material misrepresentations in
procuring naturalization.8 4 The U.S. Supreme Court discussed when both
willful misrepresentation and concealment of material fact become relevant for purposes of denying naturalization. The Supreme Court concluded, "[W]hat is relevant is what would have ensued from official
knowledge of the misrepresented fact .

.

. not what would have ensued

from official knowledge of inconsistency between a posited assertion of
the truth and an earlier assertion of falsehood." 86 Thus, the burden is
overly onerous on applicants who may have inadvertently failed to mention a visit to their origin country or overlooked one trip while completing the application.
Such unreasonable delays and pretextual denials in adjudication of naturalization applications share an obvious link: equating applicants of the
Muslim faith with terrorism." In fact, many Muslim immigrants have
spoken to the ACLU/SC about their experience with USCIS agents and
have advised the ACLU/SC they have been subject to questions pertaining to their religious practices, the mosques they attend, and the number
of times they pray."
Violations of immigration and naturalization law by CARRP policy
mechanics aside, the fact that CARRP has zero imposed deadlines in
processing these naturalization applications gives the USCIS plenary
power over its applicants." Despite being statutorily eligible, the USCIS
holds denial and stalling power over the application unless its underlying
policy is satisfied.o As a result, the application is continuously held by

82. Patrick Healy and Chris Henao, ACLU: Covert Fed Program Illegally Blacklists
Muslim and Arab Immigrants, NBC S. CAL. (Aug. 22, 2013, 3:33 PM), http://www.nbclos
angeles.com/news/local/ACLU-Contends-Covert-Federal-Program-Illegally-Blacklists-Mus
lim-and-Arab-Residents-Seeking-Citizenship-220604971.html (quoting Jennie Pasquarella).
83. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
84. See id. at 764-66 (reviewing the facts of the case).
85. Id. at 767-72.
86. Id. at 775.
87. See PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 41 (decrying CARRP's disparate impact on
Muslims).
88. Id.
89. See id. at 42 (indicating CARRP enforces no deadline for any of its processes).
90. Id.
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the USCIS as it looks for additional information and/or finds any reason
to deny the application. 9' If all else fails, the USCIS may hold the application in indefinite abeyance.9 2
The game of cat and mouse begins during these critical stages of the
naturalization application, in which the applicant has no choice but to
wait.9' When these applicants inquire about their application status they
are advised the "application is pending 'administrative checks' or additional 'security or background checks."' 9 4 The following chart, published
in ACLU/SC's report, shows some of the shocking delays in naturalization cases: 95
Delays in Naturalization Cases statutoryTime Limit - 180 Days
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Thischartdemonstrates
the lengthy delaysthateachof the naturalization
applicantsfeatured in thisreport
have endureddue to CARRPby comparison to the 180-daystatutorywait time.

Unreasonable delay of these naturalization applicants not only violates
statutory guidelines promulgated by the INA, but fails to protect verified
national security interests.9 6 In reality the federal government has no
91. Id.
92. Id.; see U.S. CITIZENS11P & IMMIGRATION SiiVs., supra note 38, at 14 ("Cases
will be held in abeyance for [one-hundred and eighty] days or until the investigation is
complete, whichever is sooner. ... [Th]e withholding of [the] adjudication period may be
extended further.").
93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2012) (requiring applicants wait at least 120 days before
petition the court on the matter).
94. PASOUARELLA, supra note 1, at 42.
95. Id. at 44.
96. See id. at 2 ("Ironically, while CARRP treats applicants as supposedly too dangerous to naturalize, they are simultaneously treated as too harmless to expeditiously investi-
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idea whether or not these individuals even pose a credible threat to the
United States." This criticism also incorporates the notion that applicants actually posing a credible national security threat are "equally dangerous whether they remain here as . . . lawful permanent resident[s] or
as .

.

. citizen[s].""

At least one decision illustrates this apparent paradox." In Singh v.
Still,'"0 "[t]he [California district court] pointed out that the government
had made 'no real effort to advance the security check on [the applicant]
for years until after [the mandamus litigation] was filed' and that, given
this inaction, '[n]othing in the government's conduct [bespoke] any urgent or serious concern with national security.""'o
CARRP policy ramifications have sent some of these applicants to federal court as statutory guidelines stipulate an applicant may sue the USCIS for a decision in federal district court if the applicant has not received
a decision "within 120 days of their examination."' 0 2 However, as evidenced by extraordinarily long delays facing some applicants, ability to
request relief from the courts does not facially solve the problem."0 3 The
USCIS must act upon ACLU/SC's recommendation to heavily reform
CARRP (or even rescind it) so it may "conform to existing immigration
law, as well as basic standards of fairness and non-discrimination."'

gate, arrest or deport, undermining any argument that applicants subject to CARRP are
true 'national security concerns."').
97. See id. at 18 (arguing the Terrorist Watchlist is "over-inclusive").
98. Id. at 44.
99. Id.
100. 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (granting applicant's request to force the
USCIS to complete his adjudication after waiting for seven years).
101. PASQUARE-LLA, supra note 1, at 44 (quoting Singh v. Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1070 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
102. Id. at 43; see 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2012) ("If there is a failure to make a determination under section 1446 of this title before the end of the 120-day period after the date on
which the examination is conducted under such section, the applicant may apply to the
United States district court for the district in which the applicant resides for a hearing on
the matter. Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to the Service to determine the
matter.").
103. See PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 44 (listing applications that were pending for
years).

104. Id. at 4.
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IV. CARRP OVERREACHES THE AUTHORITY OF CONGRESS BY
CREATING AN EXTRA-STATUTORY SECTION ON
NATURALIZATION ELIGIBILITY
The need for reform is particularly evident when considering the extrastatutory section governing naturalization eligibility created by the USCIS through its application of CARRP policy.'o CARRP provides a

clear directive, mandating denial of an applicant deemed a national security concern for any immigration benefit "except in limited circum-

stances."o' This is a serious divergence from conventional naturalization
wisdom which recognizes if an applicant meets the burden on all the requirements prescribed by the USCIS, then the USCIS has no choice but
to grant the application.107 Indeed, the ACLU/SC recognizes:
From a legal point of view, CARRP's secret exclusions are particularly troubling in the context of naturalization because any person
who meets the statutory criteria is entitled to naturalize. Yet,
CARRP teaches the opposite: that naturalization is instead a discretionary benefit to be provided only to those who not ensnared in
CARRP's overbroad national security criteria, in clear violation of
governing law.1 os

Additionally, contrary to CARRP policy the entire process of reviewing the naturalization application must not be delayed indefinitely.1 0 9
The Code of Federal Regulations directs the USCIS to "make a final determination on every naturalization application, either at the time of the
examination or, at the latest, within 120 days after the date of the examination.""' The provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) then give the applicant
the ability to file a determination suit in federal district court or have the
court instruct the USCIS how to proceed."' This statutory provision was
intended to reduce the wait period for naturalization applications and cut
down the backlog within the system."12

105. Id. at 45.
106.
107.
applicant
added).
108.

Id.
Id. at 12; see 8 C.F.R. § 335.3(a) (2013) ("USCIS shall grant the application if the
) (emphasis
has complied with all the requirements for naturalization.
Id. at 45.

109. PASQUARFLLA, supra note 1, at 12.

110. Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 335.3 (2013) (describing the time requirements for concluding
determinations on applications).
Ill. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2012); PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 12.
112. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 12; see 135 CONG. REc. H4539-02 (daily ed.

July 31, 1989) (statement of Rep. Morrison) ("This legislation, while technical in nature,
addresses a very substantial concern that so many of all of our constituents have faced, and
that is the problem of long backlogs in moving through the naturalization process once the
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Finally, 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) states, "It is the sense of Congress that the
processing of an immigration benefit application should be completed not
later than 180 days after the initial filing of the application . . . ."" Instead, current CARRP directives provide the USCIS with the ability to
bypass Congress-the Constitution endows Congress with the sole authority to "establish an [sic] uniform Rule of Naturalization"' 1 4-and ultimately set its own naturalization system of who remains in the country
and who does not."' This can result in a horrendous situation for an
individual: after going through the naturalization process and calling the
United States home for the last twenty years, he or she is no longer welcome. This may be an individual who is American in every sense-but
not enough for citizenship.
USCIS reliance upon certain information in deeming an applicant a
national security concern violates constitutional due process protections.11 First, the information may depend on unreliable sources and this
unconfirmed evidence may be used as leverage when deciding whether to
accept or deny an application."' Second, and most troubling, an applicant is never advised of what information was used to deny his or her
petition as the USCIS "never disclos[es] that information or allow[s] the
applicant to confront it."" 8
One of the tools enabling USCIS to disproportionately stop law-abiding immigrants from gaining naturalization is uncovering "false testimony."1 1 9 "As a pretextual basis to deny a CARRP case, USCIS very
often relies on the 'false testimony' exception to establish the requisite
'good moral character.' "120 This proves to be an extremely tough burden
on the applicant because even a minor, immaterial account of accused
misrepresentation can prevent the applicant from becoming

naturalized."1 2 1

time period for naturalization has been accomplished and the various requirements of naturalization have been met, delay often runs into the months and sometimes beyond a year
before an individual can actually take his or her oath of allegiance to the United States and
become a citizen.").
113. PASOUARELLA, supra note 1, at 12 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (2012)).
114. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
115. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 37.
116. Id. at 4.
117. Id. at 45.
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id. at 45.
120. Id.
121. Gonzalez v. Sec'y of Dept. of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 2012)
("A misrepresentation ... need not be material to undermine a[ ] naturalization applicant's good moral character.").
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By relying on the false testimony exception in labeling potential naturalization candidates as not having good moral character, 2 2 an applicant
applying for naturalization can lack the requisite good moral character
requirement if he or she is found to have provided any intentionally false
testimony in securing immigration benefits.12 3 Application of this disqualification can be attributed to the "vagueness and overbreadth of the
question on the N-400 naturalization application about memberships and
associations" which in practice allows the USCIS to easily claim the applicant falsely testified.1 24 Many court opinions have identified poorly defined terms in the application, thus allowing assignment of the USCIS,
courts, and immigration attorney's own definitions for vague terms. 1 2 5
The case of Mirsad Hajro,126 discussed in greater detail in the next section, dealt with alleged false testimony.12 7 Mr. Hajro "was accused of
providing false testimony [by] failing to disclose his association with a
religious practice." 12 8 The USCIS argued Mr. Hajro was not forthcoming
in his testimony, failing to "disclose his service in the Bosnian army and a
local defense group, his participation in a Muslim religious practice, and
that he carried an AK-47 when working the local defense group."1 2 9
The court rejected the USCIS's argument, noting Mr. Hajro went
above and beyond what was actually asked on the naturalization application by willingly sharing information about his military service and religious practice, even though question 8(a) "did not ask about military
service."' 3 0 After waiting almost nine years, the court further concluded

122. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 45; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (2012) (codifying
the false testimony exception).
123. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 45; USCIS Policy Manual,supra note 34, at Pt. F,
Ch. 5.
124. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 46. For example, "Question 8(a) ... asks applicants, 'Have you ever been a member of or associated with any organization, association,
fund, foundation, party, club, society, or similar group in the United States or in any other
place?"' Id. The application asks for a list of those memberships and associations without
specifying a relevant time period. Id.
125. See id. (identifying the terms "member" and "associated" included in Question
8(a) on the N-100 naturalization application).
126. See Hajro v. Barrett, 849 F. Supp. 2d 945, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding Mr. Harjo
eligible for naturalization after review of the alleged false testimony he gave in his naturalization application).
127. Id. at 849 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948; PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 46.
128. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 46.

129. Id. at 49.
130. Id.; see Hajro,849 F. Supp. 2d at 961 ("The Court agrees with Plaintiff that by its
plain language, question 8a does not request disclosure of military service or other military
groups.").
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was

deserving of naturalization' 3 '

651

and

granted

his

naturalization.13 2
The USCIS's CARRP policy should not be used in denying an application that otherwise meets all statutory criteria. 13 3 However, the USCIS
relies on unconfirmed evidence in supporting its conclusion that an applicant shall be deemed a national security concern.13 4 Additionally, by not
availing applicants of the information used in classifying them as a national security concern, the USCIS opens up the floodgates to further
"erroneous assumptions untested in the adjudicative process." 135 This
failure of disclosing information violates statutory obligations requiring
notice of an adverse decision be given to an applicant.' 3 ' This failure
directly contradicts the USCIS's obligation of providing applicants an opportunity to rebut the derogatory information used against them.13 7
Consequently, the USCIS uses the false testimony exception to delay
or deny CARRP-impacted applicants because it is the simplest method.
In so doing, the USCIS has created a backdoor in its naturalization
laws.13 8 Despite clear congressional authority in enacting immigration
statutes, the USCIS has morphed into the recent big brother of U.S. immigration law, and CARRP is being used to the detriment of law-abiding
individuals. The continued extra-statutory guidelines "den[y] applicants
the fairness they are due under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and applicable immigration regulations."' 3 9 The USCIS must follow the ACLU/SC's recommendation to refrain from barring applicant
immigration benefits for which they would otherwise qualify. 1 40 Specifically, the USCIS should stop denying naturalization applicants who meet
requisite statutory guidelines.1 4 '

131. Hajro, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 963.
132. See PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 44 (indicating Mr. Hajro spent nine years
waiting for naturalization).
133. See id. at 4 ("Applicants must not be barred from obtaining immigration benefits
for which they are legally eligible. In particular, USCIS must approve naturalization applications that meet the statutory criteria permitting naturalization.").

134. Id. at 47.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 48; see 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i)-(ii) (2013) (requiring disclosure of derogatory information with the applicant).
137. Id. at 48; 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i) (2013).
138. See PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 51 ("By giving itself the authority to deny
applications based on secret criteria that it never discloses, USCIS denies applicants the
fairness they are due under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and applicable
immigration regulations.").
139. Id. at 51.
140. Id. at 4.
141. Id.
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LAw-ABIDING IMMIGRANTS "LINKED" TO
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

For most immigrants, the path to [U.S.] citizenship generally works
like this: If you've lived here with a green card for five years, or three
if you're married to a citizen, and don't have a criminal record, it
should take a year or so to get citizenship. But that's not how it
works for everyone. Meet someone who waited [eleven] years. 14 2
Prior to the known existence of CARRP, the ACLU/SC worked with
many individuals experiencing naturalization delays.143 While working
through these backlogs the ACLU/SC uncovered a "new class" of individuals who continued "to have inordinate delays in having their naturalization applications adjudicated," and who were "denied for bizarre
reasons." 144 The following examples illustrate these instances.
A.

Tarek Hamdi

Tarek Hamdi is the husband to a U.S. born wife and a father to four
daughters-all of whom have been raised in the United States.145
Mr. Hamdi submitted his naturalization application after living in the
United States as a lawful permanent resident for nearly twenty-five
years.14 6 The U.S. government prevented him from becoming naturalized, for-to be blunt-being a Muslim. 1 4 7 Unfortunately, this is not a
rare case. "[T]he government has barred thousands of eligible, law-abiding immigrants from becoming citizens, obtaining green cards and securing other immigration benefits. . . . [The USCIS] . . . has used the

program to sweep up innocent, law-abiding Muslim immigrants, delaying
and denying their applications-all without legal authority." 14 8
The USCIS treated Mr. Hamdi as a national security concern because
of the FBI's inability to completely eliminate Mr. Hamdi as a potential
threat to the United States.149 The ACLU/SC initially filed suit in June
142. Monica Campbell, A Recently-Uncovered Federal Program Turned One Man's
Path to Citizenship into a 11-Year Trek, PUB. RAmIO INT'L (Oct. 17, 2013; 4:45 PM), http://
www.pri.org/stories/2013-10-17/recently-uncovered-federal-program-turned-one-manspath-citizenship-11-year-trek.
143. See Pasquarella & Vakili, supra note 7 (explaining its work with individuals after
September 11, 2011 and the problems it faced with naturalization delays).
144. Id.
145. Jennie Pasquarella & Ahilan Arulanantham, Muslims Need Not Apply, HuFINGTON Posr (Aug. 21, 2013, 5:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jennie-pasquarel
la/muslims-need-not-apply-b_3792214.htmi.
146. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 7.
147. Pasquarella & Arulanantham, supra note 145.
148. Id.
149. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 7.
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2010 on behalf of Mr. Hamdi, requesting "the court finally review the
matter of his eligibility to naturalize, after USCIS had lost, delayed, and
finally denied his application." 0 Eventually, litigation inadvertently led
to discovery of "previously secret USCIS policies[J" which seemed to be
the cause of the delays and discriminatory treatment experienced by
Mr. Hamdi during the process of his naturalization application. 5 '
FBI assessment and subsequent labeling of Mr. Hamdi as a national
security concern was based upon an act in which millions of Americans
partake everyday-the act of charity.152 Mr. Hamdi provided a U.S.based Islamic charity, the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF),
"his annual Islamic tithing (or 'zakhat') ... to fund humanitarian relief to
refugees and orphaned victims of wars.""' This simple act of giving negatively impacted Mr. Hamdi two years later, when "the federal government shut down BIF based on allegations of terrorism financing and
prosecuted its leader for defrauding its donors-donors like Tarek-by
telling them their money was solely being used for humanitarian

purposes."1 5 4
It is ludicrous for the USCIS to use a donation to a U.S.-based group as
a determinative factor in denying access to citizenship.
Even though Tarek's act of giving was, from his perspective, no different than a Catholic tithing to the American Red Cross, and even
though BIF was shut down precisely because the government had
determined that donors like Tarek were the victims of fraud, USCIS
nonetheless treated Tarek's application as suspect, labeling him a
'national security concern.' The agency took his application off a
'routine adjudication' track and placed it on the CARRP track,
which required the agency to concoct a pretextual reason to deny
Tarek's application in spite of his statutory eligibility to naturalize. 1 5
The link between Mr. Hamdi's lawful donation and eventual classification of BIF as a "financier of terrorism" is too remote to justify denial of
his application.' 56 Mr. Hamdi would eventually earn relief in February
2012 after U.S. District Court Judge Virginia Phillips ruled Mr. Hamdi"a devout Muslim of Egyptian descent"-was entitled to naturalization,
150. Tarek Hamdi Ruled Eligible To NaturalizeAfter II Year Battle with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, ACLU S. CAL. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.aclusocal.org/
tarek-hamdi-ruled-eligible-to-naturalize-after-1 I -year-battle-with-u-s-citizenship-and-immi
gration-service.
151. Id.
152. PASOUARELLA, supra note 1, at 7.

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 23 (noting BIF defrauded thousands of U.S. donors).
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eventually ending the continuously delayed, David versus Goliath application contest which "subjected [him] to discriminatory treatment."1 57
CARRP policy imposes extra scrutiny upon those law-abiding immigrants who have visited places linked to known terrorist activity, wired
money back to their country, or even simply attended a mosque (all of
which are of interest to the FBI). 1 58 The criteria used by the USCIS is
overly broad and, unbeknownst to these lawful immigrants, punishes
them for hailing from a region with prominent terrorist activity.15 9
CARRP documents also indicate that mere mention in a FBI file, including as a witness or a victim of a crime, almost assures an immigrant applicant will be flagged as a national security concern.'6'
B.

Hassan Razmara

Mr. Razmara migrated to the United States in 2002 through the "diversity visa lottery."161 As of September 2013 he is still waiting, and has
been waiting for nearly six years, for an answer on his application for
naturalization, which he filed in 2007.162
The main issue delaying Mr. Razmara's application is his past frequent
attendance at and affiliation to an Iranian mosque in West Covina, California, which was the subject of intense surveillance by the FBI in 2008
based on allegations of wrongdoing by the mosque's imam, Seyed M.
Mousavi.16 3 However, Mr. Razmara was neither implicated nor connected to crimes committed by Mr. Mousavi at the mosque.164
Mr. Razmara was a practicing Muslim who simply attended the mosque,

157. ACLU S. CAL., supra note 150; see Hamdi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Servs., No. EDCV 10-894 VAP DTBx, 2012 WL 632397 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2012) (granting
Mr. Hamdi citizenship).
158. Karen McVeigh, FBI Granted Power to Delay Citizenship for Muslims, ACLU
Report Says, TIE GUARDIAN (Aug. 21,2013,3:29 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/

2013/aug/21/fbi-power-delay-citizenship-muslims-aclu.
159. HUIINGTON Posr Live, supra note 77.
160. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 8; Nick Baumann, If You've Ever Traveled to a
"Suspicious" Country, This Secret Program May Target You, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 21,

2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/08/carrp-fbi-immigration-terror
ism-aclu.
161. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 8; see Diversity Visa (DV) Program, BUREAU OF

CONSULAR Aff. U.S. DiEPT OF ST. (Apr. 30, 2012), http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/
english/immigrate/diversity-visa.html ("The congressionally mandated Diversity Immigrant
Visa Program makes available up to 55,000 diversity visas . . . annually, drawn from random selection among all entries to persons who meet strict eligibility requirements from
countries with low rates of immigration to the United States.").
162. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 30.

163. Id. at 8.
164. Id.
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much like a Catholic parishioner attending the most convenient Cathedral or a Sikh attending the gurdwara (house of worship).
Mr. Razmara passed the naturalization exam the following year and
completed his interview.1 65 However, he was called three months later
for an additional interview, but the interview now included an FBI
agent.16 6 This second interview consisted of the FBI agent asking
Mr. Razmara "a series of questions about his community, his mosque,
and . . . the imam."1 67 Soon after, Mr. Razmara received a call from the
same FBI agent, advising Mr. Razmara "he would expedite his naturalization case if he agreed to work with the agency as an informant."'16 The
agent continued his requests for assistance yet Mr. Razmara "upon legal
advice that his eligibility for naturalization could not be made contingent
on his agreement to snitch on his community" never relented.16 9
Based on the interviews and meetings between the USCIS, the FBI,
and Mr. Razmara to date, his naturalization case does not indicate any
credible threat to the security of the United States.1 70 The government is
simply using Mr. Razmara to potentially supply information of interest to
the FBI. In other words, the FBI is subsidizing its work through
Mr. Razmara's contact with the USCIS. "[The] USCIS likely put his case
on a 'CARRP' track-requiring delay and ultimately denial in spite of his
eligibility to naturalize-at the FBI's request."'
C. Jamal Atalla
Jamal Atalla is another lawful immigrant who has fallen victim to USCIS's "false testimony" tactics.' 7 2 When Mr. Atalla challenged his naturalization denial in Atalla v. Kramer,'73 the USCIS argued Mr. Atalla's
failure to disclose membership or association with the Global Relief
Foundation (GRF) caused him to not be considered for naturalization.17 4
In reality, Mr. Atalla actually advised the USCIS on several occasions of
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. PASQUARILLA, supra note 1, at 8.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 9.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 46.
173. Atalla v. Kramer, CVO9-1610-PHX-NVW, 2011 WL 2457492 (D. Ariz. June 20,
2011).
174. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 49; see Atalla, 2011 WL 2457492, at *2-12 (detailing the paperwork completed by Mr. Atalla describing his affiliation with various groups as
well as other details of his application). The case also explains the United States determined, despite the legitimate relief it provided around the world, the GRF also had strong
terrorist ties. Id. at *16.
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"his volunteer activities and charitable donations to the organization and
that he did not consider himself a member or associate of the organization. "175 The court sided with Mr. Atalla, drawing an important distinction between "specific disclosures" and the nebulous label of being
"associated" with a particular group.176 The court explained:
Even if he should have though that his level of involvement with
[GRF] counted as being 'associated' with it, his specific disclosures
were far more important than this quarrel over what label to put on
those disclosures .... USCIS's attempt to find deception by ignoring
the most important parts of what was said does not comport with the
reality of oral communication or with common sense."
Mr. Atalla is a lawful permanent resident, a physician by profession,
and dedicated volunteer of emergency services.17 8 Although the federal
district court has found Mr. Atalla eligible to naturalize, "[t]he government's appeal of that decision is pending before the Ninth Circuit."1 79
D.

Mirsad Hajro

Mirsad Hajro was accused, inter alia, of failing to reveal his association
with Tablighi Jamaat, "an informal Islamic religious practice that teaches
'talking with other Muslims about their shared faith and practices and
sometimes involv[ing] traveling to other communities."'s 0 The USCIS
was quick to categorize Tablighi Jamaat as a terrorist organization, but
the district court concluded otherwise, stating, "Tablighi Jamaat was a
community of people practicing an informal religious practice, not an organized entity akin to the types of groups asked about on the naturalization form and in the interview."'s'
The USCIS frequently equates lawful charitable donations to acts allegedly evidencing a national security concern.' 8 2 Despite the non-linear
links, the USCIS has broad powers in labeling an applicant a national
security concern.' 8 3 This alarming trend should not be taken lightly.
Ultimately, when applicants are denied immigration benefits based on
national security grounds the grounds must fall under specific INA ineli175. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 49.
176. Id. at 49; Atalla, 2011 WL 2457492, at *15.
177. Atalla, 2011 WL 2457492, at *15-16.
178. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 23.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 41 (quoting Hajro v. Barrett, 849 F. Supp. 2d 945, 957 (N.D. Cal. 2012)).
181. Id. at 41; Hajro v. Barrett, 849 F. Supp. 2d 945, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
182. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 41.
183. See id. at 39 (noting problems with the Terrorist Watchlist nomination process as
one cause of CARRP's overbreadth).
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gibility guidelines.'" Specifically, applicants should not be denied "for
their lawful donations to charities later accused of terrorism financing[,]"
such denials should be based on whether "their donations were knowingly made to support terrorism financing. ." 8
VI.

CONCLUSION

From a legal perspective, CARRP unduly burdens applicants and creates the nearly impossible task of erasing any national security concern.
CARRP has made it "all but impossible for many Muslim, Arab, Middle
Eastern, and South Asian individuals to become American citizens, or
otherwise obtain legal residency or asylum status."' 8 6 The ramifications
of being branded a national security concern are extremely serious, putting many applicants applying for any immigration benefit, such as asylum, visas, green cards, and naturalization, at risk of having their
applications or petitions delayed indefinitely or denied outright.'8 7
If national security really is the concern surrounding these CARRPimpacted applicants, then, as a matter of policy, the government should
act swiftly and not merely bury these risks in red tape.'
These delays
and denials contradict the level of fairness and environment of non-discrimination that aspiring Americans expect from the U.S. government
when applying for naturalization. 8 1 Some of those impacted by CARRP
are families who have been in the United States for more than two decades. Their children have been born and raised in the United States, and
in reality, it is the only place they call home. What sets them apart from
others seeking naturalization (which it absolutely should not) is the religion they practice. Putting immigrants' religious beliefs under scrutiny
foregoes the First Amendment protections provided to them under the
Constitution and causes a significant psychological impact that should not
be overlooked.
The USCIS cannot maintain a secret policy governing the way it selects
candidates for naturalization. Instead, fair adjudication should be the
norm for all applicants, regardless of their faith.

184. Id. at 4.
185. Id.
186. Press Release, supra note 3.
187. Ann Cun, USCIS Takes Biographic Data and Clandestine Programs to New
Heights, LAwLOGIx (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.lawlogix.com/blog/uscistakesbiographic
dataandclandestineprogramsnewheights.
188. PASQUARELLA, supra note 1, at 51.
189. Id. at 59.
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